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Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury 
Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2012
Ann M. Eisenberg*
Abstract 
The Supreme Court’s May 2016 decision in Foster v. Chatman 
involved smoking-gun evidence that the state of Georgia discriminated against 
prospective black jurors during jury selection in Foster’s 1987 capital trial. 
Foster was decided on the thirtieth anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky, the 
first in the line of cases to prohibit striking prospective jurors on the basis of 
their race or gender. But the evidence of discrimination for Batson challenges is 
rarely so obvious and available as it was in Foster.
While litigants have struggled to produce evidence of discrimination 
in individual cases, empirical studies have been able to assess jury selection 
practices through a broader lens. This Article uses original data gathered from 
trial transcripts to examine race- and gender-related exclusion of potential 
jurors during several stages of jury selection in a set of thirty-five South 
Carolina cases that resulted in death sentences from 1997 to 2012. It includes 
observations for over 3,000 venire members for gender and observations for 
over 1,000 venire members for race. This is one of few studies to examine the 
use of peremptory strikes in actual trials; no previous studies of this magnitude 
have examined this topic in South Carolina.
Consistent with comparable studies, this study’s results — although 
limited in their generalizability due to data limitations — revealed that white 
and black potential jurors had substantially different experiences on their path 
to the jury box, while gender played a subtler role. Some of the findings included 
that prosecutors used peremptory strikes against 35% of eligible black venire 
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members in the data set, compared to 12% of eligible white venire members, 
and that the death-qualification process impeded a substantial number of black 
venire members from serving. These disparities contributed to overrepresentation 
of whites on the juries. The study’s findings call into question the fairness of 
some of South Carolina’s current death row inmates’ trials, and buttress the 
argument that capital conviction and sentencing procedures are incompatible 
with the need for representative and impartial juries.
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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s May 2016 decision in Foster v. 
Chatman1 involved smoking-gun evidence that the state of Georgia 
discriminated against black prospective jurors during jury selection 
in Foster’s 1987 capital trial. Prosecutors’ files included a list of black 
venire members’ names highlighted in green with “B” next to them, 
and the handwritten note, “NO Black Church,” among other things.2 
Prosecutors struck all four black prospective jurors who had been 
qualified to serve, resulting in an all-white jury.3 The Court found, in 
contrast to the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding, that “the focus on 
race in the prosecution’s file plainly demonstrates a concerted effort 
to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.”4
Foster was decided on the thirtieth anniversary of Batson 
v. Kentucky,5 the first in the line of cases to prohibit striking 
prospective jurors on the basis of their race or gender.6 But, Foster 
notwithstanding, this line of cases is known for its impotence.7 The 
main difficulty arises when litigants seek to pursue Batson and related 
challenges, which they begin by making a prima facie showing that 
a peremptory strike was exercised on a prohibited basis — the first 
1 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
2 Id. at 1744. Additional evidence included a note from an investigator who 
worked with the prosecution, stating, “[I]f we had to pick a black juror I 
recommend that [this juror] be one of the jurors”; a list titled “definite NO’s,” 
which included six names, five of which were black prospective jurors (one of 
whom was disqualified for connection to the case prior to the strike stage); 
and the jurors’ questionnaires, where their responses indicating their race had 
been circled. Id.
3 Id. at 1743.
4 Id. at 1755.
5 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6 Id. J.E.B. v. Alabama extended Batson’s prohibition on discrimination to gender. 
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
7 See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Report on 
Jury Selection Study 11-13 (2011), http://digitalcommons.law.
msu.edu/facpubs/331/; Equal Justice Initiative, Illegal Racial 
Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy 4 (Aug. 
2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-
selection.pdf (“Today in America, there is perhaps no arena of public life or 
governmental administration where racial discrimination is more widespread, 
apparent, and seemingly tolerated than in the selection of juries.”); Valerie 
P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks?, 78 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1179 (2003); Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing 
Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 
Mich. J. Race & L. 57, 61-62, 83 (2009).
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step in a three-step process to evaluate the claim.8 Under the second 
step, the striking party need only respond to the prima facie showing 
with a race- or gender-neutral basis for the strike.9 Under the third 
step, the court determines whether to accept the rationale as non-
discriminatory.10 The neutral bases put forth in the second step have 
been called an “unbounded collection of justifications” that “run the 
gamut.”11 But, the Supreme Court has directed courts to accept even 
“silly or superstitious” explanations if they appear race- and gender-
neutral.12 Rarely is the evidence of discrimination as compelling and 
available as it was in Foster, and rarely do defendants succeed in their 
Batson challenges.13
While litigants have struggled to produce evidence of 
discrimination in individual cases, empirical studies have been able 
to assess jury selection practices through a broader lens.14 This 
Article adds original data from the state of South Carolina to the 
empirical literature examining discrimination in jury selection in 
capital cases. The Article assesses whether the processes of venire 
selection, voir dire, and the peremptory striking of the jury resulted 
in disproportionate removal of women and African Americans on 
juries in a set of thirty-five South Carolina jury trials resulting in 
death sentences from 1997 to 2012.15 It is one of “only a handful 
of published studies” to examine these issues in actual trials rather 
than simulated experiments.16 All cases were used to observe 
8 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008).
9 Id. at 477.
10 Id.
11 Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than 
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1075, 1093 (2011).
12 Id. at 1096 (discussing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)).
13 Cf. Jessica Gabel Cino, Gabel on Foster v. Chatman: Stating the Obvious While 
Setting an Impossible Precedent, Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law (May 26, 
2016), http://law.gsu.edu/2016/05/26/gabel-on-foster-v-chatman-stating-
the-obvious-while-setting-an-impossible-precedent/.
14 Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina 
Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in Death Cases, 10 Ohio 
St. J. Crim. L. 103, 104 (2012).
15 The limitations of this study are addressed in more detail below, but it is 
notable that the thirty-five cases are a sample of an estimated sixty-three death 
sentences imposed after jury trials in South Carolina for the period of 1997 to 
2012. The cases were chosen based on the availability of trial transcripts that 
included relevant data. See infra Part (IV)(A). Other cases were not included 
because of inaccessibility to the author or inconsistent reporting among courts.
16 Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
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gender as a factor in removal, including observations for 3,031 
venire persons, while a subset of twenty-three cases was used to 
observe prospective jurors’ race, including observations for 1,088 
individuals. The Article assesses whether certain jury pools at the 
outset were racially representative of the defendants’ respective 
communities; whether, and if so, why women and African Americans 
were removed disproportionately during voir dire; and how defense 
and prosecution exercised their peremptory strikes among whites 
versus blacks and men versus women.
Because the question of support for the death penalty 
tends to differ across race and gender lines,17 this study focuses in 
particular on removal for cause for opposition to, or support for, the 
death penalty. Capital juries are typically “death-qualified,” or put 
through a questioning process to ensure they are willing to impose 
a death sentence upon the defendant.18 Although the Supreme 
Court has stated that capital juries have the mandate to “express 
the conscience of the community,”19 the death-qualification process 
means that judges in capital trials remove prospective jurors who 
oppose the death penalty due to a presupposed inability to apply 
the law impartially.20 As a result, approximately one-third of the 
population, most of whom are women or African Americans, is likely 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 
97 Iowa L. Rev. 1531, 1538 (2012).
17 Id. at 1534, 1550.
18 See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s 
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 195, 245 
n.353 (2009); Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for A 
Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 
2005 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 519, 521 (2005) (“Despite arguments that the voir dire 
practice of death-qualifying a jury creates a predisposition toward finding 
guilt, the Supreme Court has held the practice constitutional. While the Court 
has affirmed that the prosecution is entitled to death-qualify the sentencing 
jury, and that death-qualifying a jury does not violate a defendant’s rights per 
se, the Court has not mandated that a jury be death-qualified before the initial 
guilt phase of the trial or that the same, unitary jury hear both phases. Thus, 
courts are given the discretion to death-qualify the jury—with an eye towards 
the sentencing phase—before the guilt phase has been conducted, or to seek 
some other alternative such as a bifurcated jury instead.”) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis omitted); State v. Spann, 308 S.E.2d 518, 519-20 (1983) 
(“When a potential juror is prevented from rendering an impartial decision 
or voting for the death penalty, the trial court can exclude him because of his 
inability to carry out his duty under the law.”). 
19 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
20 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986).
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to be removed from capital juries because of such beliefs.21
The results of this study show that prospective jurors’ race 
played a critical role during the jury selection process, resulting 
in disproportionate representation of whites, whereas prospective 
jurors’ gender told a slightly subtler story.22 These findings merit 
attention for several reasons. At the broadest level, discriminatory 
jury selection practices implicate the legitimacy of the legal system. 
Juries’ purpose is to “guard against the exercise of arbitrary power.”23 
But, unrepresentative juries may do just the opposite, leading to 
unpredictable and discriminatory outcomes.24 Arbitrariness in the 
administration of justice undermines society’s trust in the rule of 
law and violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.25
Unrepresentative juries are also particularly problematic in 
capital cases. Most critically, death-qualified juries are more inclined 
to return convictions and death sentences, undermining defendants’ 
21 See Joseph Carroll, Who Supports the Death Penalty?, Death Penalty Info. 
Ctr. (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/gallup-poll-who-
supports-death-penalty. As discussed in more detail below, see infra Part II(A), 
the Court has upheld death-qualification’s effects on jury representativeness 
because “fair cross section” jurisprudence does not apply to petit juries and 
even if it did, those who oppose capital punishment do not themselves form a 
distinctive group. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 (1987). Another 
third of the population is ineligible to serve as capital jurors because they 
would vote for death automatically if the defendant were found guilty of 
murder. John Blume, An Overview of Significant Findings from the Capital 
Jury Project and Other Empirical Studies of the Death Penalty Relevant to Jury 
Selection, Presentation of Evidence and Jury Instructions in Capital Cases 5 
(Spring 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ 
research/death-penalty-project/upload/empirical-studies-summaries-
revised-spring-2010.docx).
22 The causal effect of these characteristics cannot be proven with certainty because 
of the absence of controls or the use of regression analysis. However, some causal 
effect can reasonably be inferred based on the data’s consistency with previous 
studies that did use such controls and methods. See infra Parts III-V.
23 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
24 See id. at 531; David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital 
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 3, 103-08, 124-
25 (2001); Janell Ross, How big of a difference does an all-white jury make? A leading 
expert explains., Wash. Post (May 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/30/how-big-a-difference-does-an-all-white-
jury-make-a-leading-expert-explains/?utm_term=.fe62be75a8e2 (discussing 
research illustrating relationships between jury racial composition and 
arbitrary trial outcomes).
25 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
239-40 (1972).
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rights to an impartial jury.26 Processes that siphon women and 
black venire members off of juries undermine juries’ fairness and 
effectiveness in numerous other ways as well: more diverse juries are 
likelier to “engage in wider-ranging deliberations,” to address issues 
of race in their deliberations, and to counterbalance other jurors’ 
biases.27 Because South Carolina jury selection has many similarities 
with jury selection in other states, the findings discussed here likely 
reflect issues with capital jury representativeness and fairness that 
arise throughout the justice system.28
Most immediately, the data discussed here have implications 
for the thirty-eight South Carolina inmates on death row as of this 
writing.29 The most compelling racial disparity revealed by this 
study is comparable to that revealed in a study of the same topic in 
North Carolina by Catherine Grosso and Barbara O’Brien.30 Their 
study has been the subject of ongoing litigation over the validity of 
certain North Carolina inmates’ capital sentences.31 Twenty-nine of 
26 Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since Furman, Is the Death 
Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1444 (2004); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, 
Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the 
“Empathic Divide,” 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 69, 73 (2011).
27 Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation: 
A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 667, 668-69 
(2011).
28 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and 
Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. Legal Stud. 277, 282 (2001). Aspects 
of South Carolina’s history stand out, however. As of 2002, “[o]nly six states 
ha[d] executed more death-sentenced inmates,” making South Carolina’s 
execution rate relatively high compared to its murder rate. John Blume, Twenty-
Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the “Modern” Era 
of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 285, 292-93, 297 (2002). 
Further, although this may be the case in other states, race continues to play a 
substantial role in South Carolina’s capital punishment scheme. For instance, 
“substantial variation exists in South Carolina’s death sentencing rates when 
the race of the defendant and the race of the victim are taken into account. 
African-Americans who kill whites are sentenced to death at approximately 
three times the rate of whites who kill whites . . . [A] person charged with 
killing someone who is white is more than seven times more likely to be 
sentenced to death than a person charged with killing an African-American.” 
Id. at 298.
29 S.C. Dep’t of Corr., Death Row List (2017), http://www.doc.sc.gov/
pubweb/news/death-row-report.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
30 See O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7.
31 State v. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 67 
(2016). Grosso’s and O’Brien’s study was used pursuant to a provision of 
North Carolina’s now-repealed Racial Justice Act, which created a cause 
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South Carolina’s current death row inmates had sentences imposed 
from 1997 to 2012.32 This study includes twelve of their trials, with 
information on juror race available for eight.33 Although the limited 
generalizability of the data is addressed in more depth below, the 
fairness of South Carolina’s jury selection processes for these trials 
is of interest in and of itself.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A explains the 
significance of jurors’ race and gender in the context of capital 
punishment. Part II.B describes the relationship between race and 
gender and specific pre-trial procedures for jury empanelment, as 
well as relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Taylor 
v. Louisiana,34 Witherspoon v. Illinois,35 and Batson v. Kentucky36 and 
related judgments.37 Part III surveys literature and empirical studies 
examining race and gender in capital punishment. Part IV.A explains 
the methodology of the instant study and addresses its limitations, 
such as the limited availability of trial transcripts and the absence 
of controls for race- and gender-neutral bases for removal. Part 
IV.B provides the results of the empirical analysis of the data. 
Part V discusses the data’s implications, including the difficulty 
of reconciling jury representativeness with capital conviction and 
sentencing procedures.
of action for death row inmates to use statistical evidence revealing racial 
discrimination in their trials. See infra Part III.
32 See S.C. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 29.
33 The trials included in this study where the inmates are currently on death row 
are State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248 (S.C. 2000), State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 
572 (S.C. 2010), State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 2007), State v. Finklea, 
697 S.E.2d 543 (S.C. 2010), State v. Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. 2007), 
State v. Owens, 664 S.E.2d 80 (S.C. 2008), State v. Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648 
(S.C. 2005), State v. Starnes, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000) (“Starnes I”), State 
v. Starnes, 698 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 2010) (“Starnes II”), State v. Williams, 690 
S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 2010), State v. Winkler, 698 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 2010), State v. 
Woods, 676 S.E.2d 128 (S.C. 2009). The cases among these with information 
containing juror race are Aleksey, Bryant, Finklea, Lindsey, Sigmon, Starnes I, 
Williams, and Woods.
34 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
35 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
36 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
37 E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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II. The Significance of Jurors’ Race and Gender
A. Jury Composition Influences Case Outcomes, Particularly 
in Capital Cases
Jurors’ traits are not generally outcome-determinative.38 
Rather, “verdicts usually depend more on the facts of the case 
and less on the personal characteristics of the jurors.”39 Thus, 
“[d]etermining whether race, sex, or other juror characteristics 
influence how capital case jurors vote is difficult. Jurors tend to vote 
for death in more egregious cases and for life in less egregious cases 
no matter what their own characteristics.”40
Nevertheless, juror characteristics do influence jury 
deliberations and verdicts in capital cases.41 Capital cases differ from 
other trials in the gravity of the potential penalty, the amount of 
discretion given to the jury, and the bifurcation of the trial between 
the verdict and penalty phases.42 For instance, in the sentencing 
phase in South Carolina, jurors are given a list of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and are told only that they may choose a 
life sentence instead of death for “any reason or no reason at all.”43 
“[C]ompared to most jury decisions,” Theodore Eisenberg and 
colleagues argue, “[b]ecause capital sentencing is so discretionary, 
considerable room exists for a juror’s personal characteristics to 
influence her judgment.”44
Various studies have shown that the racial composition of a 
jury influences the likelihood of the jury imposing a death sentence.45 
38 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 28.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 277.
41 See id. at 283, 285-86, 308 (noting influence of jurors’ race and religion on 
juror voting).
42 See id. at 282.
43 Id. at 283.
44 Id.; see also David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty 
in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings 
from Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638, 1643 (1998) (“The potential 
influence of race in the administration of the death penalty takes root in the 
broad exercise of discretion that state laws grant prosecutors and juries.”); 
Lynch & Haney, supra note 26, at 69 (discussing the additional potential for 
reliance on racial stereotypes in capital cases).
45 E.g., William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner, & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing 
in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial 
Composition, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171, 195 (2001); Mustafa El-Farra, Race 
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In particular, white jurors are more likely to vote for death than black 
jurors,46 men are more likely to vote for death than women,47 and 
“support for the death penalty among whites is highly correlated with 
measures of anti-black racial prejudice and stereotyping.”48 Further, 
“the more a juror supports the death penalty, the more likely she is 
to find a criminal defendant (capital and noncapital alike) guilty in 
the first place,” and more likely to ultimately vote for death.49 Other 
juror characteristics, such as religion, influence outcomes as well.50 
The Supreme Court and Congress have acknowledged an 
interest in having proportional representation of the community 
on juries.51 Indeed, “[a]s early as the twelfth century, English 
law recognized the danger that inhered in allowing members of a 
minority community to be tried entirely by . . . majority jurors.”52 
Not only does a representative jury seem and act more neutral, better 
reflect the judgment of the community, promote public confidence 
in the judicial process, and keep the justice system from becoming 
“the organ of any special group or class,”53 it also eases the potential 
blow of the “minority effect,” where a minority faction of less than 
three on a particular jury tends to be overwhelmed by the stance of 
the majority.54 Diversity also allows a jury to serve its democratic 
and political functions more effectively, acting as a “check on 
government functionaries,”55 “guard[ing] against the exercise of 
arbitrary power,”56 and counteracting the biases or zealotry of judges 
and the Jury: Racial Influences on Jury Decision-Making in Death Penalty Cases, 4 
Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 219, 226 (2006); Lynch & Haney, supra 
note 26, at 84 (“[T]here were differences in final case outcomes as a function 
of defendant race and ratio of white men on the jury.”).
46 Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 298.
47 Lynch & Haney, supra note 26, at 69.
48 Id. at 73.
49 Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 283-84.
50 See id. at 285-86.
51 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1993); e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1940); 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
527 (1975).
52 Hiroshi Fukurai, The Representative Jury Requirement: Jury Representativeness and 
Cross Sectional Participation from the Beginning to the End of the Jury Selection Process, 
in The Jury System: Contemporary Scholarship 169-70 (Valerie 
Hans ed., 2006).
53 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Fukurai, supra note 52, at 
170, 172.
54 Fukurai, supra note 52, at 170.
55 Id. at 172.
56 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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and prosecutors.57
Thus, the composition of the jury is central to a trial, with the 
stakes higher and the effects stronger in capital cases. As is the case 
in South Carolina,58 “the typical jury exercises virtually complete 
discretion on the life or death decision once it finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance present in the case.”59 Given the nearly 
1,000-year-old common law value in having a representative jury 
render such grave decisions, the mechanisms for filling the jury box 
represent much more than simple administrative procedure.
B. The Centrality of Jury Composition Underscores the 
Importance of Empanelment Procedures, Each of Which 
Interacts with Prospective Jurors’ Race and Gender
In light of the impact that the composition of juries can have 
in capital cases, the pre-trial processes of venire selection, voir dire, 
and the use of peremptory strikes wield significant influence over 
each case as a whole. The discussion below addresses how each phase 
uniquely interacts with the empanelment or removal of women and 
black venire members.
1. The Venire Selection Process
The venire selection process typically involves two steps. 
“First, a list of names from which the venire can be drawn must 
be compiled . . . Second, names from the source list are [randomly] 
selected to form the jury venire.”60 Defendants are not entitled to 
a jury composed in whole or in part of members of their race.61 
However, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court required venire 
selection to draw from a “fair cross section of the community” as 
a fundamental aspect of the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.62 Taylor also held that the Equal Protection Clause 
57 Fukurai, supra note 52, at 172 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31 and Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
58 Eisenberg et al., supra note 28, at 282-83.
59 Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 1644.
60 Mark McGillis, Jury Venires: Eliminating the Discrimination Factor by Using a 
Statistical Approach, 3 How. Scroll: Soc. Just. L. Rev. 17, 17 (1995).
61 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
62 U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury”); Taylor, 419 U.S. 
at 528.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits systematic exclusion of 
particular racial (or gender) groups from jury service.”63
Taylor’s mandate is often not the practice in reality, however. 
Taylor v. Louisiana and its progeny “offer[] no specific mechanism to 
guarantee the cross-sectional representation on the jury itself,”64 and 
venires continue to demonstrate disproportionate representation.65 
As Hiroshi Fukurai explains: 
One recurrent problem with this method is that 
randomly selected jury panels are not always fully 
or regularly representative of all segments of the 
relevant community. More specifically, racial and 
ethnic minorities, as well as the young, old, and 
the poor, are consistently underrepresented in most 
federal and state court jury pools and venires.66 
Voter and driver registration lists are the most commonly 
used sources and are perhaps the most comprehensive lists of 
citizens available.67 But “each has significant deficiencies with regard 
to inclusiveness and representativeness.”68 Voter lists may exclude 
as much as one third of the adult population, neglecting racial 
minorities in particular, while driver registration lists underrepresent 
women and the elderly.69 The actual impact of the fair cross-section 
doctrine has itself never been critically assessed.70
63 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-33; see also Duncan, supra note 57, at 149 (applying 
Sixth Amendment to states); Heather Davenport, Note, Blinking Reality: Race 
and Criminal Jury Selection in Light of Ovalle, Miller-El, and Johnson, 58 Baylor 
L. Rev. 949, 955 (2006).
64 Fukurai, supra note 52, at 171 (emphasis added).
65 E.g., Valerie P. Hans, Jury Representativeness: It’s No Joke in the State of New York, 
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y Blog (Jan. 20, 2012), http://jlpp.org/blogzine/
jury-representativeness-its-no-joke-in-the-state-of-new-york/.
66 Fukurai, supra note 52, at 144 (explaining four reasons behind these lacunae: 
underrepresentation on voter registration lists, exclusionary screening 
questions (such as inquiries about economic hardship), subjective selection 
criteria focusing on integrity and character, and failure to examine the rights 
of excluded jurors).
67 Id. at 146-47.
68 Id. at 146.
69 Id. at 146-47.
70 Id. at 148.
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2. Removals for Cause during Voir Dire
After venire members arrive to court, the voir dire stage 
poses a second hurdle on their path to the jury box. During voir dire, 
which is usually lengthier for capital cases, the court deems jurors 
to be “qualified” or “unqualified” after their views have been vetted 
through questioning and cross-examination.71 Members of the 
venire may be removed for bias or strong feelings; familiarity with 
the case, parties, or witnesses; or any other experience or view that 
may undermine impartiality in rendering a decision — including, in 
capital cases, views on the death penalty.72
But, commentators note flaws inherent in the voir dire 
process.73 Primarily, it is a subjective process that depends on 
self-reporting. Jurors may not disclose their biases because they 
are unaware of them, uncooperative, resentful of the court, or 
apprehensive of being evaluated, among other reasons.74 Jurors 
may also demonstrate inconsistency in self-assessments of their 
own biases.75 Subjective standards for removals combined with 
substantial judicial discretion might facilitate pretextual removals 
based on discriminatory motivations, whether conscious or not.76
The South Carolina Supreme Court has affirmed that in 
capital cases, “[a] prospective juror may be excluded for cause 
when his or her views on capital punishment would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.”77 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of 
this practice in Lockett v. Ohio.78 The parties may challenge venire 
members they find biased or otherwise unqualified based on voir 
dire questioning,79 but the decision as to whether to remove them is 
within the sole discretion of the trial judge.80 Thus, in capital cases 
71 Id. at 149-50; see also Neil Vidmar & Valerie Hans, American Juries: 
The Verdict 89, 93 (2007).
72 See Vidmar & Hans, supra note 71, at 93-94.
73 See, e.g., Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1182.
74 Neil Vidmar, Case Studies of Pre- and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and Civil 
Litigation, in The Jury System: Contemporary Scholarship 198-200 
(Valerie Hans ed., 2006).
75 Id. at 200-05.
76 See Lee Smith, Note, Voir Dire in New Hampshire: A Flawed Process, 25 Vt. L. 
Rev. 575, 592 (2001).
77 State v. Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d 557, 561 (S.C. 2007).
78 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
79 See, e.g., State v. Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 541 (2010).
80 Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d at 561.
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in South Carolina, judges frequently remove prospective jurors for 
cause when the prospective jurors express strong reservations about 
the death penalty, with the rationale that “[t]he state as well as the 
accused [should] enjoy[] a right to an impartial jury.”81
An excerpt from the transcript of a 2007 South Carolina 
capital trial82 illustrates the nature of questions posed to jurors and 
the types of personal moral qualms that may preclude them from 
serving on a capital jury:
Judge: I understand you’re . . . a pastor? . . .
Potential Juror: No, I am not a pastor, my wife is.
. . . . 
Judge: Could you as a juror in a sentencing phase, 
depending upon the facts . . . and the law . . . render 
a sentence of life imprisonment?
A: Judge, as I afore stated, my belief and my belief 
biblically and also personally I feel that anyone can 
be rehabilitated and I don’t feel that always life in 
confinement is rehabilitation.
Judge: I see. . . . [A]s a juror in a sentencing 
phase, . . . could you render a sentence of death? I 
think I know but I do have to ask the question.
A: No, I do not feel that I could render a sentence of 
death. 
 . . . . 
 [M]y church and church family do take a 
stand against the death penalty. And I do believe in 
the scripture and the scripture teaches me . . . that 
the word of God says that vengeance is mine saith 
81 Bruce J. Winick, Witherspoon in Florida: Reflections on the Challenge for Cause of 
Jurors in Capital Cases in a State in which the Judge Makes the Sentencing Decision, 37 
U. Miami L. Rev. 825, 825-26 (1983).
82 Transcript of Record (on file with author).
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the Lord. And . . . thou shalt not kill. . . . I’m truly 
against the death penalty.
Defense Attorney: . . . I think you also wrote [in your 
questionnaire] that, my church teaches its members 
to abide by state laws.
A: . . . [N]ot only my church, my bible also teaches 
me, you know, that we should obey the rules of the 
land as well as obey the rules of God. But in my 
case, . . . I don’t think the laws of the land would also 
let me do anything to go against what I believe in. 
 . . . . 
Defense Attorney: Please don’t think I’m trying to — 
this is my situation, okay. I need a jury. The justice 
system needs a jury full of people that have a bunch 
of different backgrounds and views, okay.
 . . . . 
A: . . . [I]f I don’t believe it in [sic] I just don’t feel 
that I could give a honest, moral — I just don’t feel 
that I could sit there and pass judgment . . . .
 . . . .  
Judge: . . . As I say, the law does not require somebody 
to do something they cannot in good conscience do. 
And so that’s why we have these things, to find out 
how people feel. 
 I, under the examination of this juror, I think 
I’m going to excuse him from serving on the trial of 
this case.83
83 Id. at 712-28.
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In a 2009 capital trial,84 another juror expressed similar concerns:
Potential Juror: I guess I would say — you know, you 
guys are seeking the death penalty, and although I 
don’t think this gentleman . . . deserves to live I think 
my religious beliefs would stop me from penning 
something saying that he got the death penalty . . . .
 I’m just going to say, you know, I think he 
deserves to be shot, I mean, I really do, but when it 
comes down to it, I was raised Catholic . . . you know, 
Jesus died for everybody . . . . Not just me, not just 
you, but even the most heinous person out there he 
died for — 
Judge: Yes sir.
Potential Juror: — He died for, and who am I to say 
that someone deserves to be put to death. That is not 
my responsibility.
Judge: Yes sir.85
The dialogues above among judge, attorney, and venire 
member demonstrate the probing inquiry in which counsel and 
the court engage with each potential juror in capital cases. These 
excerpts also illustrate the effect of a juror’s religion on his or her 
potential exposure to removal.86
The influence of race and gender on individuals’ attitudes 
and opinions toward capital punishment may be subtler than the 
influence of religion. But the extended, highly personal quality 
of these inquiries shows the room for jurors’ backgrounds and 
experiences to affect their responses and likelihood of removal. 
Although the prospective jurors above established relatively clear 
84 Transcript of Record (on file with author).
85 Id. at 1157-58.
86 Grosso and O’Brien note that “some lower courts have prohibited strikes 
based on religious affiliation.” Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1534 (citing 
United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2003); Andrew D. Leipold, 
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 Geo. 
L.J. 945, 957 (1998)).
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reasons for their removal — their staunch opposition to the death 
penalty — the nature of the questioning above also suggests an 
element of subjectivity. Venire members could potentially be 
removed for vaguer conscientious scruples. The subjectivity of the 
process also illustrates the potential for pretextual challenges made 
by attorneys with discriminatory motivations.
The Court has held constitutional the fact that removal for 
opposition to the death penalty may have a disparate impact on 
certain groups.87 In Lockhart v. McCree, the Court held that death 
qualification does not violate Taylor or the right to an impartial jury 
because people who object to the death penalty do not themselves 
form a distinctive group.88 The following year, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 
the Court upheld death qualification’s disparate impacts on certain 
groups because Taylor’s fair cross-section requirement applies only 
to venires.89 The Court also reasoned that death qualification did not 
involve excluding prospective jurors on the basis of race or gender, 
but rather, “related to the [State’s] legitimate interest in obtaining a 
jury that does not contain members who are unable to follow the law 
with respect to a particular issue in a capital case.”90
87 Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 (1987). The death qualification 
process itself has undergone various changes in the past several decades. In 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968), the Court narrowed the pre-
1968 standard of removing prospective jurors for having any “conscientious 
scruples” against the death penalty, holding that to allow “removal for cause 
of jurors based merely on their general scruples against capital punishment” 
was to deny a defendant his due process right to an impartial jury. John 
D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death 
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 195, 319 n.901 
(2009); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-23; Winick, supra note 81, at 831-32. 
Witherspoon thus restricted removal on this basis to venire persons who make 
it “unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the 
imposition of capital punishment . . ., or (2) that their attitude toward the 
death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the 
defendant’s guilt.” 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis added). Seventeen years 
later, the Court expanded permissible removals on this basis with Wainwright 
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), which reinstituted some of the judge’s discretion.
88 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986). In Lockhart, the Court 
overruled the lower courts’ determination that the death qualification process 
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of a fair-cross-
section representation and jury impartiality because the process resulted 
in “conviction-prone” juries. Id. at 167-73 (questioning the reliability of 
petitioner’s social science evidence on the matter).
89 483 U.S. at 402, 415 (1987); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-
40 (1976) (holding that intentional discrimination is unconstitutional but 
laws’ or policies’ racially disparate impacts are not).
90 Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 416.
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Although death qualification’s constitutionality has been 
upheld, the process still stands to undermine juries’ ability to serve 
their function fairly and indiscriminately. Valerie Hans and Alayna 
Jehle observe that exclusions based on death penalty attitudes 
“may have a deleterious impact on the representativeness and 
impartiality of the capital jury.”91 In one example, researchers in a 
California study of 1,275 community residents found that the “jury 
qualification requirements tend[ed] to disrupt the representative 
composition of the general population,” skewing the composition 
towards white men.92 Others have also noted that women and black 
prospective jurors are more likely to be removed during voir dire for 
their opposition to capital punishment.93
3. Peremptory Strikes
After voir dire, the parties may choose to exercise a number 
of peremptory strikes, also known as peremptory challenges, which 
are vetoes that parties may use against individual jurors without 
stating a reason for the veto.94 In South Carolina, defendants charged 
with serious crimes are allowed ten strikes and the state is allowed 
five.95 Peremptory strikes are controversial: no constitutional right 
protects their use, and while some consider them to be essential to 
the jury system,96 others forcefully advocate their elimination.97 One 
commentator called peremptory challenges “the last best tool of 
Jim Crow.”98
91 Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1181.
92 Fukurai, supra note 52, at 151, 162, 165-66.
93 Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years Since Furman, Is the Death 
Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1444 (2004).
94 Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and 
Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 447 (1996).
95 S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1110 (1976).
96 Melilli, supra note 94.
97 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266-67 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
that when Batson was decided, Justice Thurgood Marshall predicted that the 
decision would not achieve its goal, and opining that Miller-El reinforced the 
reality that “[t]he only way to ‘end the racial discrimination that peremptories 
inject into the jury-selection process’ . . . [is] to ‘eliminat[e] peremptory 
challenges entirely.’”) (third alteration in original).
98 Mary Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? 
Some Data from One County, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 695, 696 (1999) (internal 
citation omitted).
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Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny prohibited peremptory 
strikes motivated by prospective jurors’ race or gender, holding 
that they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.99 The Batson test now requires a party seeking to 
challenge a strike to establish a prima facie case that his or her 
opponent exercised a strike on the basis of race,100 or, per J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., gender.101 The burden then shifts to the non-
moving party to provide a race- or gender-neutral explanation 
for the strike.102 The court then determines whether purposeful 
discrimination motivated the strike.103
Although the subject of ample litigation, Batson and related 
decisions are known for their lack of impact.104 This apparent 
inefficacy itself is cited as a potential indication that peremptory 
challenges should be eliminated altogether.105 As mentioned above, 
the central weakness is the fact that, when the non-moving party 
in a Batson or J.E.B. motion must provide a reason for the strike 
in question other than race or gender, attorneys are easily able to 
provide neutral-sounding rationales.106 “These perfunctory hearings 
fail to meaningfully interrogate the reasons prosecutors offer as 
99 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 
U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); 
see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Recalcitrance: The Miller-El Remands, 5 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 131, 131 (2007). Batson overruled Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965), where the Court had held that equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment would only be violated if “the defendant could 
prove that the prosecutor struck African American jurors in every case.” 
Johnson, infra at 133. The decision in Swain “set the bar so high for proving 
discriminatory intent that no litigant won a Swain claim for [twenty] years.” 
Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 7, at 12. This means the window 
for winning claims based on racial discrimination has only relatively recently 
been opened. See id. Practice suggests that it has not been opened very far, 
however. Some have argued that other distinctive groups, such as people with 
religious beliefs, should also be protected from discriminatory peremptory 
challenges. See Anthony D. Foti, Note, Could Jesus Serve on a Jury? Not in the 
Third Circuit: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges in United States v. Dejesus and 
Bronshtein v. Horn, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 1057, 1057-58 (2006).
100 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
101 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
102 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
103 Id. at 98.
104 Fukurai, supra note 52, at 167.
105 Melilli, supra note 94, at 483 (noting Justice Marshall’s argument that Batson’s 
goals could only be achieved by eliminating peremptory challenges).
106 See Rose, supra note 98, at 696.
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race neutral motivations for peremptorily striking Black jurors.”107 
Consequently, defendants “monopolize the making of Batson 
claims,” yet, “the success rate of such claims by criminal defendants 
is manifestly unimpressive.”108 Although anecdotal, it is telling that 
despite the rather blatant evidence in Foster, the pursuit of Foster’s 
Batson claim took thirty years of litigation.
The role of race and gender in the exercise of peremptory 
strikes has spurred discussion as tense as that surrounding the 
existence of the strikes themselves. In a study of challenges based 
on Batson from 1986 to 1993, Kenneth Melilli found that 87.38% 
of challenges during the period challenged the striking of black 
jurors.109 He argued:
Because peremptory challenges are exercised after 
the challenges for cause, any prospective juror who 
is peremptorily struck is presumably an individual 
who is not subject to a valid challenge for cause. For 
this reason . . . peremptory challenges are frequently 
exercised on the basis of group affiliations rather than 
individual characteristics. Indeed, evaluating people 
on the basis of stereotypes is an inherent aspect of 
the peremptory challenge system. The peremptory 
challenge system allows lawyers and litigants to 
impose these stereotypes upon the jury selection 
process without articulating these potentially 
offensive and divisive prejudices.110
Consistent with Melilli’s concerns, commentators continue 
to observe parties’ disproportionate strikes of certain groups, with 
strike rates depending on the race of the defendant.111
107 Price, supra note 7, at 57.
108 Melilli, supra note 94, at 459.
109 Id. at 462.
110 Id. at 447 (internal citations omitted). Lawyers’ motivations for exercising 
peremptory challenges on the basis of race or gender are not necessarily based 
solely upon derogatory stereotypes. For instance, a defense attorney may take 
race into account for her choices of strikes if she feels that an attempt to comply 
with Batson would force her to ignore, to her client’s detriment, her knowledge 
of the statistical evidence of how jurors’ attitudes are influenced by their race. 
E.g., Richard C. Dieter, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Blind Justice: 
Juries Deciding Life and Death with Only Half the Truth 4 
(2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/BlindJustice Report.pdf.
111 Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1190-91; Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A 
Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. 
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A repeated concern in Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
discrimination in capital trials is preventing the arbitrary application 
of the law, which potentially violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.112 The Court explained 
in Taylor and reaffirmed in Batson that “[t]he purpose of a jury is to 
guard against the exercise of arbitrary power — to make available 
the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against 
the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor.”113 Yet, in the 1987 decision 
McCleskey v. Kemp,114 which has been called “the Dred Scott decision 
of our time,”115 the Court concluded that “apparent disparities in 
sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.”116 
A discriminatory purpose, as opposed to a disparate impact, must be 
shown to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.117 This 
high burden explains, in part, the impotence of Batson.
The decision in Foster in 2016 did not appear to alter the 
Batson playing field substantially. The evidence, discussed above, 
prompted Justice Kagan to query during oral arguments, “Isn’t 
this as clear a Batson violation as a court is ever going to see?”118 
Commentators agree that the decision was limited in scope at best, 
and at worst, “create[d] an artificial and impossibly high burden of 
proof for future cases.”119
Crim. L. Rev. 1099, 1100, 1100 n.6 (1994); see Rose, supra note 98, at 697-
99 (observing that black venire members were peremptorily struck by the 
prosecution in a sample that consisted primarily of black defendants).
112 See e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972).
113 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)(emphasis added); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
114 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
115 Diann Rust-Tierney, A Personal Reflection on McCleskey v. Kemp, ACLU: 
Speak Freely (Apr. 23, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/capital-
punishment-racial-justice/personal-reflection-mccleskey-v-kemp.
116 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
117 Id. at 292.
118 Dahlia Lithwick, Peremptory Prejudice, Slate (May 23, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/john_
roberts_s_court_sees_racism_in_foster_v_chatman.html; see also Cino, supra 
note 13 (noting Justice Alito’s concurrence “hint[ing] that you basically have 
to have a slam dunk to win a Batson challenge. Foster’s case is a standout 
from what is usually a subtler and more discreet form [sic] racial bias that 
permeates and infects other cases.”).
119 See Cino, supra note 13.
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III. Survey of Studies Addressing Race and Gender in Capital 
Punishment
Studies on racial disparities in capital sentencing emerged as 
a substantial body of scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s in the wake 
of Furman v. Georgia,120 which for a short time effectively abolished 
capital punishment because the Court found that juries exercised 
unfettered discretion and could impose death discriminatorily.121 
Furman was soon followed by Gregg v. Georgia,122 which upheld state 
death penalty schemes that incorporated “channeled discretion.”123 
These early studies tended to focus on the race of the victim or 
defendant.124 In a 1990 study using data from Georgia, David Baldus 
and colleagues examined whether legal developments post-Furman 
had “achieved their promise to end arbitrariness and discrimination 
in death sentencing in this country.”125 The study found a strong race-
of-victim effect, where “the average defendant with a white victim 
faced a statistically significant 7- to 9- percentage-point higher risk 
of a death sentence than did a similarly situated defendant whose 
victim was black.”126 Baldus attributed this effect to prosecutorial 
discretion.127 Generally, the researchers concluded that jury decisions 
120 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman had no controlling opinion, but held that 
arbitrariness and racial disparities in death sentencing violated the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. at 242, 249-51 (Douglas, J. concurring); id. at 274, 277, 294-
95 (Marshall, J. concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring); id. at 313 
(White, J. concurring); id. at 365 (Marshall, J. concurring). Furman imposed a 
de facto moratorium on the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
168-69 (1976).
121 Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the Death Penalty: The Tension Between Individualized 
Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 45, 46 (1995).
122 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
123 Id. at 206-07. The death penalty was reinstated in South Carolina post-Furman 
on July 2, 1974. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/south-carolina-1 (last visited Aug. 4, 2016).
124 See Hemant Sharma et al., Race and the Death Penalty: An Empirical Assessment 
of First Degree Murder Convictions in Tennessee After Gregg v. Georgia, 2 Tenn. J. 
Race, Gender, & Soc. Just. 1, 5 (2013) (discussing 1980s race-of-victim 
studies); Ogletree, supra note 111 (noting 1970s race-of-defendant findings); 
Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the 
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 754, 762, 783 
(1983) (examining victim, defendant, and geography).
125 David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A 
Legal and Empirical Analysis 394 (1990).
126 Id. at 401.
127 Id. at 403.
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in Georgia were highly unpredictable,128 and “that the problems 
with fairness and equal justice in Georgia’s death-sentencing system 
[were] widespread.”129 The study established a landmark for the 
examination of the role of race in the administration of capital 
punishment.
Until the last fifteen years or so, most social science on race or 
gender and the justice system continued to focus on questions other 
than jury representativeness.130 More recent studies focused on jury 
representativeness have often been experimental, i.e., conducted 
in simulated scenarios.131 Few published studies have examined 
the use of peremptory challenges in real trials.132 Both before and 
after Batson, a variety of experimental and other laboratory studies 
demonstrated the importance of race in jury selection.133
In 1999, Mary Rose aimed to fill the dearth of data on 
peremptory challenges by observing trials in a North Carolina court 
in order to “investigate how prosecutors and defense attorneys 
use[d] . . . peremptory challenge[s] and how characteristics of 
seated jury panels compare[d] to those of the venire.”134 She 
observed thirteen felony criminal jury trials with a total of eighteen 
defendants, seventeen of whom were black and two of whom were 
women, in addition to 348 venire members questioned during voir 
dire.135 Rose concluded that, although blacks and whites had the same 
likelihood of being excused from the jury via peremptory challenge, 
black prospective jurors had a greater likelihood of being dismissed 
by the state — 71% of black prospective jurors dismissed — whereas 
81% of whites dismissed were excused by the defense.136 She found 
that women and men had roughly equal likelihood of being excused 
through peremptory challenges, and equal likelihood of being 
excused by one side or the other.137 She noted her results’ limited 
generalizability, but concluded they “suggest the need for a more 
informed debate about the [use of the] peremptory challenge[] . . . in 
modern criminal trials.”138
128 Id. at 403-04.
129 Id. at 409.
130 Rose, supra note 98, at 697.
131 Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1536-38.
132 Id. at 1538.
133 Id. at 1536.
134 Rose, supra note 98, at 697.
135 Id. at 697-98.
136 Id. at 698-99.
137 Id. at 699.
138 Id. at 695.
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In 2001, Baldus and colleagues focused specifically on 
peremptory challenges in capital murder trials.139 In a study of 
Philadelphia cases from the 1980s and 1990s, they concluded that 
race was the predominant factor in prosecutorial use of peremptory 
challenges, with gender also playing a significant role.140 Race and 
gender were also significant factors for defense counsel, with the 
defense particularly disfavoring men.141 The researchers found that 
death-sentencing rates were “higher . . . when the prosecutorial 
strike [rate against] black venire members was high.”142 By contrast, 
“[t]he results indicated that a highly discriminatory defense counsel 
effort against non-black venire members was associated with a five 
percentage point lower overall death-sentencing rate.”143 These 
findings illustrate how jury selection and the use of peremptory 
challenges can shape capital trial outcomes. They also highlight 
the ethical dilemmas faced by defense attorneys, where the duty of 
zealous advocacy might be perceived to compel targeting white, male 
jurors for removal due to their higher tendency to be conviction- and 
death-prone.144
In 2010-2011, informed in part by the Baldus Philadelphia 
study and several others with similar findings,145 Barbara O’Brien and 
Catherine Grosso examined peremptory strikes in North Carolina by 
investigating jury selection processes for the trials of all defendants 
on the state’s death row as of July 1, 2010, in order to assess whether 
venire members’ race had been a factor in prosecutors’ use of 
peremptory challenges.146 They studied 173 proceedings with a total 
of 7,421 venire members, gathering data from court documents and 
jury selection transcripts.147 Their study used detailed, descriptive 
information about one sample of venire members in order to control 
139 Baldus et al., supra note 24.
140 Id. at 60.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 107 n.234.
143 Id.
144 See Hans & Jehle, supra note 7, at 1191 (discussing defense attorney’s belief 
that “it is unethical for a defense lawyer to disregard what is known about the 
influence of race and sex on juror attitudes in order to comply with Batson v. 
Kentucky and its progeny.”).
145 For a summary of studies conducted by Billy Turner and colleagues in 
Louisiana, John Clark and colleagues in a southeastern state, and Richard 
Bourke and Joe Hingston in Louisiana, in addition to others, see Grosso & 
O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1538-39.
146 O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 2.
147 Id. at 2-3.
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for factors other than race that may have accounted for the decision 
to strike.148
O’Brien and Grosso concluded that “[p]rosecutors exercised 
peremptory challenges at a significantly higher rate against 
black venire members than against all other venire members.”149 
Specifically, the prosecution struck 52.6% of eligible black venire 
members and 25.7% of all other eligible venire members.150 They 
found this disparity to be even greater in cases where defendants 
were black.151 The differences persisted when the data were adjusted 
to rule out possible race-neutral causes for removals, such as 
opposition to the death penalty, so that racial disparities in strike 
patterns “could not be attributable to the possibility that relevant 
attitudes vary along racial lines.”152
O’Brien and Grosso’s study has been central to litigation 
over four North Carolina death row inmates’ sentences.153 The 
North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) of 2009 “explicitly 
authorized the use of statistical evidence in determining whether 
racial discrimination was a significant factor in death sentences.”154 
Robert Mosteller explains that in State v. Robinson, the first decision 
under the Act: 
[T]he RJA demonstrated its potential as an 
important new tool to eliminate the use of race-based 
peremptory challenges. . . . [T]he trial court, relying 
heavily on statistical evidence . . . ruled that race 
was a significant factor in the prosecution’s use of 
peremptory challenges, vacated the death sentence, 
and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.155 
148 Id. at 8.
149 Id. at 11.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 12. In these cases, “the average strike rate was 60% against black venire 
members and 23.1% against other venire members.” Id.
152 O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 13.
153 State v. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, 152 (N.C. 2015); State v. Augustine, 780 
S.E.2d 552 (N.C. 2015); Neil Vidmar, The North Carolina Racial Justice Act: An 
Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness in Death Penalty Litigation, 97 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1969, 1971, 1971 n.9 (2012) (discussing use of the O’Brien and Grosso 
study in litigation over Robinson’s sentence and others).
154 Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina 
Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in Death Cases, 10 Ohio 
St. J. Crim. L. 103, 104 (2012).
155 Id. at 105.
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Three additional death sentences were subsequently vacated 
as well.156 However, in 2012, “a very different legislative majority 
than the one that passed the RJA rewrote the law . . . [and] 
significantly reduce[d] in importance but [did] not eliminate the use 
of statistical evidence . . . .” 157 In 2015, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the vacated sentences on procedural 
grounds.158 The inmates’ petition for certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court was denied in October 2016.159 The short-
lived RJA may have been ineffectual in this instance, and unique in 
general — South Carolina lacks any comparable law. However, this 
litigation shows empirical studies’ potential for use in actual cases 
to compensate for evidentiary difficulties in individual Batson claims.
Several studies have considered the role of race and gender 
in South Carolina capital cases,160 although none have paralleled 
O’Brien and Grosso’s study of peremptory challenges and none 
have delved deeply into issues of jury representativeness. Michael 
Songer and Isaac Unah examined the role of race in South Carolina 
156 Campbell Robertson, Bias Law Used to Move a Man Off Death Row, N.Y. Times 
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/us/north-carolina-law- 
used-to-set-aside-a-death-sentence.html?pagewanted=2&_r=3; Order  Granting 
Motions for Appropriate Relief, State v. Golphin, No. 97 CRS 47314-15 (Sup. Ct. 
N.C. Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rja_order_12-13-12.
pdf. The inmates are Marcus Robinson, Tilmon Golphin, Christina Walters, 
and Quintel Augustine. As mentioned above, North Carolina’s 2012 Racial 
Justice Act (RJA) was an important factor in these vacaturs. The RJA provided 
that “[n]o person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death or shall 
be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or obtained on the 
basis of race.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2010 (2009), repealed by S.L. 2013-154 
§ 5(a) (June 19, 2013). In 2013, the North Carolina legislature repealed the 
RJA. In 2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s 
decision and remanded the cases to give prosecutors more time to respond 
in the “unusual and complex” case involving statistical data. Robinson, 780 
S.E.2d at 152; Augustine, 780 S.E.2d 552. In May 2016, the inmates filed their 
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
petition cites O’Brien’s and Grosso’s study. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, petition 
for cert. (U.S. May 13, 2016) (No. 15-1397), http://www.scotusblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/15-1397-Marcus-Robinson-v-State-of-North-
Carolina-Petition-for-a-Writ-of-Certiorari.pdf.
157 Mosteller, supra note 154, at 105-06.
158 Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151 at 151-52.
159 Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 67 (2016) (mem.).
160 E.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence 
in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 306 (2003); Michael J. 
Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial 
Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 161 (2006).
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prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty in their study, The 
Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the 
Death Penalty in South Carolina.161 They concluded:
Legally impermissible . . . victim and defendant 
characteristics . . . affect capital case selection. . . . 
Perhaps most distressingly, the study confirms that 
insidious racial disparities still haunt South Carolina’s 
death penalty system. South Carolina prosecutors are 
[three] times more likely to seek the death penalty in 
white victim cases than in black victim cases.162
As to death qualification, the practice of removing jurors who 
oppose the death penalty in capital cases has been widely criticized 
as resulting in biased and unrepresentative juries, as discussed 
above.163 Scholars have observed in particular the process’s disparate 
impact on potential women and African American jurors.164 Robert 
Fitzgerald and Phoebe Ellsworth, among the first to study the 
issue in the early 1980s, found that death-qualified jurors were not 
representative of the general population. Rather, they found that 
approximately  15% of whites were excluded compared to 25% 
of blacks, and that capital juries were more biased towards the 
prosecution and a guilty verdict.165 The Capital Jury Project recently 
produced similar findings, concluding that certain distinctive groups 
(including racial minorities, women, and Catholics) were less likely 
to be able to serve on capital juries and that death-qualified juries 
were more likely to convict and impose a death sentence.166 
IV. South Carolina Data
This study attempts to build upon projects such as O’Brien 
161 Songer & Unah, supra note 160.
162 Id. at 205-06.
163 See Lynch & Haney, supra note 26; Winick, supra note 81.
164 E.g., Lynch & Haney, supra note 26.
165 Death Qualification, Capital Punishment in Context, http://www.
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/deathqualification (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2016); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime 
Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 31, 46 
(1984) (concluding that death-qualified juries are more likely to exclude 
women and African American men).
166 Death Qualification, supra note 165.
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and Grosso’s by investigating whether race and gender interacted 
with the likelihood and manner of prospective jurors’ removal from 
a set of cases resulting in death sentences in South Carolina from 
1997 to 2012. The inquiry here is focused additionally on whether 
removal for opposition to the death penalty had a disparate impact 
on women and black venire members.167
A. Methodology
One coding instrument was used to enter all data on 
prospective jurors’ characteristics and manner of removal, which were 
determined almost entirely from transcripts of voir dire questioning. 
Trial transcripts were acquired from the Office of Appellate Defense, 
a division of the South Carolina Office of Indigent Defense. The 
gender of potential jurors tended to be apparent from their names or 
the judges’ or attorneys’ use of the terms, “sir,” “ma’am,” “Mr.,” or 
“Ms.” Potential jurors’ race was discernible only where transcripts 
explicitly stated such information (for instance, by indicating, “Juror 
33, a White Female, entered the room.”).
Because data on potential jurors’ gender was more easily 
discernible, the set of workable trial transcripts was smaller for 
examining race than it was for gender. Thus, the analysis of gender 
as a factor in removal was based on thirty-five trials from the period 
of 1997 to 2012 that resulted in death sentences,168 including 
167 For an overview of capital punishment jurisprudence and statistics in South 
Carolina, see John H. Blume & Lindsey S. Vann, Forty Years of Death: the Past, 
Present, and Future of the Death Penalty in South Carolina (Still Arbitrary After All 
These Years), 11 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 183 (2016).
168 State v. Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248 (S.C. 2000) aff ’g State v. Aleksey, No. 
E784245 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Sept. 1, 1998); State v. Barnes, 753 S.E.2d 546 
(S.C. 2013) rev’g State v. Barnes, No. H870420 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Jan. 6, 
2011); State v. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State v. Binney, No. 
F981513 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Nov. 14, 2002); State v. Bixby, 698 S.E.2d 572 
(S.C. 2010) aff ’g State v. Bixby, Nos. 2004GS0100321A, 2004GS0100321C 
(S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 21, 2007); State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 
2007) aff ’g State v. Bryant, No. G515142 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Oct. 9, 2004); 
State v. Burkhart, 640 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 2007) rev’g in part State v. Burkhart, 
Nos. E698460-62 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Mar. 2004); State v. Cottrell, 657 S.E.2d 
451 (S.C. 2008) rev’g State v. Cottrell, No. I265178 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Apr. 
6, 2005); State v. Evans, 637 S.E.2d 313 (S.C. 2006) aff ’g State v. Evans, No. 
H359051-52 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Sept. 22, 2004); State v. Evins, 645 S.E.2d 
904 (S.C. 2007) aff ’g State v. Evins, No. 2003GS4202533A (S.C. Ct. Gen. 
Sess. Nov. 19, 2004); State v. Finklea, 697 S.E.2d 543 (S.C. 2010) aff ’g State 
v. Finklea, No. G501546 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Sept. 6, 2007); State v. Haselden, 
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observations for 3,031 venire members. The analysis of race as a 
factor was based on a subset of 23 cases that had data for venire 
members’ race available among those 35 (including 19 with data on 
venire members’ race at the voir dire and peremptory strike stages 
577 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 2003) rev’g in part State v. Haselden, No. F851854 (S.C. 
Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 10, 2001); State v. Hill, 604 S.E.2d 696 (S.C. 2009) aff ’g 
in part State v. Hill, No. F185132 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 8, 2000); State v. 
Jones, 681 S.E.2d 580 (S.C. 2009) rev’g State v. Jones, No. E640538 (S.C. Ct. 
Gen. Sess. Mar. 14, 2007); State v. Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1998) aff ’g State 
v. Kelly, No. D931318 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Aug. 14, 1995); State v. Laney, 
627 S.E.2d 726 (S.C. 2006) rev’g State v. Laney, No. G099682 (S.C. Ct. Gen. 
Sess. Oct. 19, 2001); State v. Lindsey, 642 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. 2007) aff ’g State 
v. Lindsey, No. H252531 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 24, 2004); State v. Locklair, 
535 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2000) aff ’g State v. Locklair, No. E231434 (S.C. Ct. Gen. 
Sess. Sept. 22, 1998); State v. Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556 (S.C. 2009) aff ’g State 
v. Mercer, No. H128342 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Apr. 22, 2006); State v. Morgan, 
626 S.E.2d 888 (S.C. 2006) vacating State v. Morgan, No. G487949 (S.C. Ct. 
Gen. Sess. Mar. 9, 2004); State v. Motts, 707 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 2011) aff ’g State 
v. Motts, No. I359760 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Dec. 2, 2007); State v. Owens, 
664 S.E.2d 80 (S.C. 2008) aff ’g State v. Owens, No. E658835 (S.C. Ct. Gen. 
Sess. Feb. 14, 2003); State v. Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105 (S.C. 2000) rev’g 
State v. Quattlebaum, No. E499159 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Mar. 4, 1998); State 
v. Rivera, No. 2011-UP-138, 2011 WL 11733625 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) aff ’g 
State v. Rivera, No. I715656 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 13, 2008); State v. Sapp, 
621 S.E.2d 883 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State v. Sapp, No. G040321 (S.C. Ct. Gen. 
Sess. May 19, 2003); State v. Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State 
v. Sigmon, No. G556370 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. July 18, 2002); State v. Stanko, 
741 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 2013) aff ’g State v. Stanko, No. I742833 (S.C. Ct. Gen. 
Sess. Nov. 19, 2009); State v. Starnes, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000) (“Starnes I”) 
rev’g State v. Starnes, No. E682636 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Apr. 25, 1997); State 
v. Starnes, 698 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 2010) (“Starnes II”) aff ’g State v. Starnes, 
No. E682636 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Nov. 17, 2007); State v. Tench, 579 S.E.2d 
314 (S.C. 2003) aff ’g State v. Tench, No. F862590 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 8, 
2000); State v. Vazquez, 613 S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 2005) aff ’g State v. Vazquez, No. 
2002GS2602786B (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Oct. 5, 2003); State v. Weik, 587 S.E.2d 
683 (S.C. 2002) aff ’g State v. Weik, No. E091046 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. May 29, 
1999); State v. Williams, 690 S.E.2d 62 (S.C. 2010) aff ’g State v. Williams, 
No. H360518 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 19, 2005); State v. Winkler, 698 S.E.2d 
596 (S.C. 2010) aff ’g State v. Winkler, No. I252573 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 
8, 2008); State v. Wise, 596 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 2001) aff ’g State v. Wise, Nos. 
F034429-31, F497161 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Feb. 1, 2001); State v. Woods, 676 
S.E.2d 128 (S.C. 2009) aff ’g State v. Woods, No. H055517 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 
Dec. 8, 2006).
  Of these thirty-five cases, nineteen cases had information concerning race, 
gender, voir dire, and peremptory strikes; twelve cases in addition to those had 
information on gender, voir dire, and strikes; and four cases had information 
on gender and voir dire only.
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and four with data on venire members’ race during voir dire only),169 
including observations for 1,088 venire members. These cases were 
selected based on availability to the author, and it is hoped that more 
data can be entered for this project.
The research presented here thus has several limitations. 
First, it is neither a simple random sample of South Carolina capital 
punishment cases, nor inclusive of all cases for a given period. 
Records on file with the author indicate that between 1997 and 2012, 
the state of South Carolina imposed 63 death sentences using juries, 
including five re-sentencings of repeat defendants. The conclusions 
here must therefore be taken with a grain of salt: they are limited in 
their generalizability, and future research with more comprehensive 
data may help confirm or refute these findings. Further, because 
this set of trials resulted in death sentences, juror characteristics or 
pre-trial procedures may already have been skewed toward death. 
The data are therefore less representative than a sample including 
jurors who had acquitted or chosen life sentences. The statistical 
analysis here also provides only summaries and correlations and 
does not control for factors other than race and gender, such as prior 
convictions or strike eligibility,170 which may have contributed to the 
results. Observations made for race may be less generalizable than 
observations made for gender due to the smaller sample size.
Nevertheless, the findings presented here are not trivial. 
Several characteristics of the data suggest elements of normalcy to 
these trials, including that (1) the rates of excusals for cause in this 
study also reflect the rates of excusals for cause in other studies;171 
169 Aleksey, 538 S.E.2d 248; Barnes, 753 S.E.2d 546; Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418; 
Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582; Burkhart, 640 S.E.2d 450; Evins, 645 S.E.2d 904; 
Finklea, 697 S.E.2d 543; Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 445; Hill, 604 S.E.2d 696; 
Jones, 681 S.E.2d 580; Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99; Laney, 627 S.E.2d 726; Locklair, 
535 S.E.2d 420; Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556; Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105; Sapp, 
621 S.E.2d 883; Sigmon, 623 S.E.2d 648; Stanko, 658 S.E.2d 94; Starnes I, 
531 S.E.2d 907; Vasquez, 613 S.E.2d 359; Williams, 690 S.E.2d 62; Wise, 
596 S.E.2d 475; Woods, 382 S.C. 153, 676 S.E.2d 128. Four among the cases 
with race information available had data for voir dire only and not peremptory 
strikes. Thus, the case set for race and peremptory strikes included 19 cases. 
The case set for race and voir dire included 23 cases.
170 See O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 4 (“‘Strike eligibility’ refers to 
which party or parties had the chance to exercise a peremptory strike against 
a particular venire member. For instance, if the prosecution struck someone 
before the defense had a chance to question that person, that juror would be 
strike eligible to the prosecution only.”).
171 Cf. tbl.1; Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size 
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(2) the juries in these cases were selected from venire pools that 
were relatively representative of their counties in cases for which 
that information was available (see Table 1 below); and (3) the 
findings here are consistent with findings in previous studies. This 
analysis thus provides meaningful insight into how race and gender 
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3%) divided by (20% 
population) = 15% 
less than expected]












1%) divided by (14% 
population) = 1% 
less than expected]
NO (p > .99, 
2-tail Fisher 
exact)
and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 425, 436 (2009).
172 Calculated based on trial transcripts from which this data could be reasonably 
discerned.
173 Community demographics were calculated using government census data 
and excluded residents who were neither white nor black. See United States 
Census 2010, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/2010census/ 
(follow “Population Finder” hyperlink by selecting “South Carolina; then 
follow “Areas Within” hyperlink after selecting “South Carolina”; then follow 
“Search” hyperlink after selecting “Counties / Municipios”; then follow “Areas 
Within” after selecting the desired county) (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
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TABLE 1:
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9%) divided by (15% 
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7%) divided by (15% 
population) = 47% 
less than expected]












8%) divided by (15% 
population) = 53% 
less than expected]
NO (p = .11, 
2-tail Fisher 
exact)
174 Determined using the comparative disparity test articulated in Duren 
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), and Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 
327 (2010). The test has three prongs for showing a violation of Taylor’s 
requirement that venires be drawn from a fair-cross section of the community: 
“(1) the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group . . .; (2) the 
group’s representation in the jury pool is not fair and reasonable in relation 
to the number of such persons in the population; and (3) the under-
representation of the group results from systematic exclusion of the group 
in the jury selection process.” Jury Managers’ Toolbox: A Primer on Fair Cross 
Section Jurisprudence, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. (2010), http://www.ncsc-
jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/What%20We%20Do/A%20
Primer%20on%20Fair%20Cross%20Section.ashx. The second prong is 
based solely on those eligible for jury service who are also available. Id. at 3. 
“Absolute disparity describes the proportional difference in the representation 
of the distinctive group . . . . Comparative disparity measures the percentage 
by which the number of distinctive group members in the jury pool falls short 
of their number in the community.” Id. To calculate comparative disparity, 
divide the absolute disparity percentage by the percentage of the jury-eligible 
population, to indicate the percentage less of the group that is present than 
would normally be expected. Id.
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Table 1 represents the racial composition of the venires of 
seven cases for which the data were available, juxtaposed alongside 
the composition of the counties where the trials took place. For 
instance, the first row and second column show that the trial of 
Anthony Woods involved a venire comprised of 47% black prospective 
jurors and 53% white prospective jurors. The third column provides 
the racial composition of Clarendon County (52% black and 48% 
white), where Woods’ trial took place. The column entitled “Venire 
Representativeness” indicates the determination that, according to 
the Supreme Court’s “comparative disparity” test, Woods’ venire 
pool represented a fair cross-section of the community in terms of 
its racial composition. The final column includes the conclusion as 
to whether any difference between the county and the venire was 
statistically significant, which shows that even where a venire might 
fail the doctrinal test for representativeness, the venire may not be 
unrepresentative according to other measures.
The data in Table 1 establish a general idea of how 
representative the venire pools were in these seven cases, providing 
some context for the significance of the subsequent selection 
procedures (i.e., knowing if there were zero black venire members 
represented at the beginning might theoretically help explain low 
strike rates of black prospective jurors). One weakness is that the 
comparative disparity test is meant to be calculated based on the 
available, jury-eligible element of the population,175 which Table 1 
does not include. The information presented in Table 1 should thus 
be treated as an approximation.
Based on this approximation, Clarendon, Greenville, Horry, 
and Cherokee Counties appear to have provided adequately racially 
representative venire pools for the respective trials held there, 
with Cherokee County the only one under-representing whites. 
The “maybes” account for the fact that the Supreme Court has not 
embraced a bright-line rule of what it means to pass the various fair 
cross-section tests.176 Lexington was the only county that appeared 
to underrepresent blacks in its venire pools. Although the disparity 
was not statistically significant, the Mercer, Finklea, and Jones trials 
would clearly fail the comparative disparity test.
175 Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 328-29 (2010).
176 Id. at 329-30, 330 n.5.
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2. Men versus Women in Set of 35 Cases, 1997-2012
a. Status throughout Entire Selection Process 
TABLE 2:
Summary of All Removals, by Gender†
Men Women Row Total











































Column Total 1,533 Individuals 1,498 Individuals 3,031 Individuals 
(100%)
†  χ2 (5, N = 3,031) = 2.155, p = 0.8274. P-values were calculated using the tools 
at www.openepi.com with the confidence level set at 99.99%.
The results shown in Table 2 compare the means by which 
the men and women among the 3,031 venire members observed 
were removed during pre-trial procedures, if at all. For example, 
the first row shows that 167 male venire members were brought 
to court without reaching voir dire questioning because the court 
had filled its requirements for qualified jurors from whom to select 
the jury. These 167 men constituted 11% of all male jurors who 
went through the selection process. Similarly, 171 women, or 11% 
of all female venire members, were brought to court and sent away 
without questioning.177
177 This number and proportion are likely substantially higher. However, trial 
transcripts reported this information inconsistently. Some involved a mass 
questioning pre-voir dire, where many jurors of an indeterminate number 
were turned away because of age, prior convictions, hardship, and other 
statutory bases for excuse from jury service. Other transcripts reported a 
list of jurors who did not reach voir dire questioning. Thus, the first row of 
this table should be viewed as a placeholder, with the actual proportion not 
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The data show no significant difference between men and 
women at any stage (p = .8274, χ2). A total of 1,533 men and 1,498 
women went through the jury selection process, and roughly the 
same percentages of each were excused without being questioned 
(11%), excused for cause (53%), and qualified without being reached 
for peremptory challenges (5-6%). Rates of 14-16% of each gender 
were struck by parties, 12% of each gender were seated on a jury, 
and 2-3% of each gender served as alternates.
b. Removals for Cause Based on Pro- or Anti-Death 
Stance
TABLE 3:
Removals for Views on Death, by Gender†
Pro-Death Removal Anti-Death Removal Row Total
Women 54 Individuals
(21% of women 
removed for views on 
death penalty)
(30% of pro-death 
removals)
205 Individuals
(79% of women 
removed for views on 
death penalty)





(46% of men removed 
for views on death 
penalty)
(70% of pro-death 
removals)
149 Individuals
(54% of men  
removed for views on 
death penalty)







(34% of death view-
based removals)
354 Individuals




† 2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.
The data in Table 3 indicate who the court removed, among 
men and women, for expressing views too pro- or anti-capital 
punishment (jurors who were removed for other reasons, such 
as medical excuses and financial hardship, were omitted from the 
data set for this analysis). For instance, the first cell in the first row 
shows that 54 women were removed for indicating that they would 
automatically apply the death penalty if the defendant were found 
guilty of murder. The next cell to the right shows that 205 women 
were removed for indicating that they would be unable to impose 
particularly significant to the issues being discussed here.
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the death penalty. Both cells show that, of women removed for their 
views on capital punishment, 21% were removed for favoring the 
death penalty too strongly, while 79% were removed for opposing 
the death penalty.
The difference between men and women in Table 3 is 
significant at the .001 level using a 2-tail Fisher exact test. Men 
were removed more than women for favoring the death penalty too 
strongly (constituting 70% of pro-death removals), whereas women 
were removed more than men for opposing the death penalty too 
strongly (constituting 58% of anti-death removals). However, 
like women, a majority of men removed for their views on death 
sentencing were removed for opposition (54% of men removed for 
death views) rather than for their pro-death views (46%).
c. Peremptory Strikes: Defense and Prosecution 
Impacts According to Gender
TABLE 4:
Proportion of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes, by Gender†




(59 % of D Strikes)
134 Individuals





(41% of State Strikes)
96 Individuals





(49% of Total Strikes)
230  
(51% of Total Strikes)
489 Individuals
†  2-tail Fisher exact, p = 0.0002909
The data in Table 4 indicate prosecutor and defense use of 
peremptory strikes broken down by gender. The first row shows that 
the defense struck 192 men and 134 women, and that the defense 
thus used 59% of its strikes on men and 41% of its strikes on 
women. The next row down indicates that the prosecution struck 
67 men and 96 women (with the lower numbers resulting from the 
prosecution having half as many strikes as the defense), using 41% 
of its strikes on men and 59% of its strikes on women.
The differences between the strikes used on each gender 
shown in Table 4 are significant at the .001 level using a 2-tail Fisher 
exact test. Namely, the defense struck men at a higher rate while the 
prosecution struck women at a higher rate. However, the comparable 
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rates resulted in roughly equal proportions of each gender being 
struck overall.
3. Whites versus Blacks in Subset of 23 Cases, 1997-2012
a. Status Throughout the Entire Selection Process178
TABLE 5:
Summary of Removals/Placements throughout Selection Process, by Race†
Whites Blacks Row Total
Excused for Cause 284 Individuals
(33% of whites 
removed)
130 Individuals






























Column Total 854 Individuals 234 Individuals 1,088 Individuals 
†  χ2 (4, N = 1,088) = 43.75, p < .001. Data for individuals who arrived at the 
courthouse but did not reach voir dire were removed because of inconsistency 
among the transcripts and the lack of race data available at that stage.
The data in Table 5 indicate the manners in which whites 
and blacks among the 1,088 assessed were removed during pre-trial 
procedures, if at all. For example, the first cell in the first row shows 
that 284 whites were excused for cause, or roughly 33% of all white 
potential jurors. The next cell shows that 130 black potential jurors 
were excused for cause, constituting approximately 56% of black 
venire members. 
The differences illustrated in Table 5 are significant at the 
.001 level with a chi square test. Blacks were excused for cause at 
a higher rate than their white counterparts. The overall percentage 
of blacks struck by peremptory challenge was lower than the overall 
percentage of whites struck, although this result is discussed in 
greater detail in Section IV.C in light of the need to account for the 
178 A very small number of venire members were neither white nor black, and 
they were removed from the data set in order to simplify the analysis.
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high rate of for-cause removals of blacks. Blacks were seated on 
juries at a lower rate than white venire members, at 17% and 24% of 
the respective venire groups.
b. Removals for Cause Based on Pro- or Anti-Death 
Views
TABLE 6:
Removals for Views on Death, by Race†
Pro-Death Removal Anti-Death Removal Row Total
Blacks 2 Individuals
(3% of blacks removed 
for views on death 
penalty)
(3% of pro-death  
removals)
75 Individuals
(97% of blacks removed 
for views on death 
penalty)




(47% of whites removed 
for views on death 
penalty)
(97% of pro-death 
removals)
72 Individuals
(53% of whites removed 
for views on death 
penalty)






(31% of removals based 
on views on death 
penalty)
147 Individuals
(69% of removals based 
on views on death  
penalty)
212 Individuals
† 2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.
The data in Table 6 show the percentages of blacks and 
whites who were removed for being either pro- or anti-death among 
those jurors removed for their views on the death penalty (as with 
gender, jurors who were removed for other reasons, such as medical 
excuses and financial hardship, were omitted from the data set for 
this analysis). For instance, the first cell in the first row shows that 
two African Americans were removed for cause because of their 
indication that they would automatically impose the death penalty 
if the defendant were found guilty. These two individuals were three 
percent of those black prospective jurors removed for their views on 
death. The next cell to the right shows that 75 blacks were removed 
for being unable to impose the death penalty, or 97% of black 
prospective jurors removed for their views on capital punishment.
The differences presented in Table 6 are statistically 
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significant at the .001 level with a 2-tail Fisher exact test. White 
venire members were removed at a much higher rate than their 
black counterparts for favoring the death penalty too strongly to 
sit as impartial members of the jury. More whites were excused for 
favoring the death penalty than for opposing it. By contrast, the 
vast majority of blacks who were excused for their views on death 
were excused for opposing capital punishment. Blacks constituted a 
disproportionately high percentage (75 of 147 individuals, or 51%) 
of prospective jurors removed for anti-death views.
c. Peremptory Strikes: Defense and Prosecution 
Impacts According to Race
TABLE 7:
Percentage of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes, by Race†




(99% of D Strikes)
3 Individuals





(65% of State Strikes)
36 Individuals





(87% of Total Strikes)
39 Individuals
(13% of Total Strikes)
307 Individuals 
† 2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.
The data in Table 7 illustrate defense and prosecutorial 
peremptory strikes broken down by race. The first row and first 
column show, for instance, that the defense used 200 of its strikes 
on white individuals, or 99% of its peremptory strikes exercised. The 
next column shows that the defense struck three black individuals, 
constituting one percent of its total strikes. The differences in Table 
7 are significant at the .001 level with a 2-tail Fisher exact test. 
While the defense struck virtually no black prospective jurors, the 
prosecution used 65% of its strikes on whites and 35% of its strikes 
on blacks.
Blume and Vann have observed that Lexington and Horry 
Counties in South Carolina have dramatically higher death sentencing 
rates than other counties.179 A death sentence that was vacated in 
179 Blume & Vann, supra note 167, at 205-06. Five of the cases used to analyze 
race in this study were from Lexington County. See State v. Finklea, 697 S.E.2d 
543 (S.C. 2010); State v. Jones, 681 S.E.2d 580 (S.C. 2009); State v. Kelly, 
502 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1998); State v. Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105 (S.C. 2000); 
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2016 for various racial bias issues came from Lexington County and 
prosecutor Donald Myers, who has been nicknamed “Death Penalty 
Donnie” for his aggressive pursuit of the death penalty.180 Thus, the 
table below shows peremptory strike patterns based on race with 
Lexington and Horry removed in case they skewed the data in Table 7.
TABLE 7.1:
Percentage of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes by Race with Lexington and 
Horry Counties Removed†




(97% of D Strikes)
3 Individuals





(56% of State Strikes)
26 Individuals





(84% of Total Strikes)
29 Individuals
(16% of Total Strikes)
177 Individuals 
† 2-tail Fisher exact, p < .001.
Table 7.1 shows that the differences in the parties’ use of 
strikes remained at the same proportions and statistically significant 
at the .001 level, even with the removal of the two notable counties. 
To illustrate the relationship between the peremptory strike 
stage and the overall empanelment process, Table 8 combines the 
data in Table 7 with the overall race data found in Table 5.
TABLE 8:
Summary of Removals/Placements throughout Selection Process by Race, with 
Parties’ Use of Peremptory Strikes†
Whites Blacks Row Total
Excused for Cause 284 Individuals 130 Individuals 414 Individuals
Remaining after  
Voir Dire
570 Individuals 104 Individuals 674 Individuals
Total Struck 268 Individuals 39 Individuals 305 Individuals
Starnes I, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000); Blume & Vann, supra note 167, at 229-
30. Donald Myers was prosecutor for all of them. Three of the cases were from 
Horry County. See State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. 2007); State v. Stanko, 
741 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 2013); State v. Vasquez, 613 S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 2005); 
Blume & Vann, supra note 168, at 230.
180 John Monk, Avenging Angel? A look at 5 of Donnie Myers’ more memorable death 
penalty cases, The State (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.thestate.com/ 
news/local/article67122927.html.
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TABLE 8:
Summary of Removals/Placements throughout Selection Process by Race, with 
Parties’ Use of Peremptory Strikes†
Whites Blacks Row Total
Struck by Prosecution 68 Individuals 36 Individuals 104 Individuals
Struck by Defense 200 Individuals 3 Individuals 203 Individuals
Percentage of Post-Voir 
Dire Eligible Venire 
Members Struck by 
Prosecution
68/570 = 12% 36/104 = 35%
Percentage of Post-Voir 
Dire Eligible Venire 
Members Struck by 
Defense
200/570 = 35% 3/104 = 3% 
†  χ2 (4, N = 114.5) p < .001 (calculated first five rows and first two columns of 
chart).
Table 8 combines data from Tables 5 and 7 to illustrate that 
the prosecution’s strikes accounted for eliminating 12% of whites 
who were qualified during voir dire and 35% of blacks who were 
qualified. It shows that the defense’s strikes eliminated 35% of 
whites who were not removed during voir dire and three percent of 
blacks. The differences are statistically significant at the .001 level.
V. Discussion of Results
A. Venire Stage and Lexington County
In light of the discussion of Taylor’s questionable 
implementation in practice, the mixed data in Table 1 show 
surprisingly successful jury pool representativeness. However, given 
the differences among counties, the results suggest ample room for 
variability according to locale.181 Each of the three Lexington County 
trial venires, for instance, underrepresented blacks according to 
the approximation of the comparative disparity test. As mentioned 
above, Lexington County also stands out because of its high rates 
of death sentencing — “approximately five times greater [than] the 
national average and seven times [greater than] the South Carolina 
average.”182 Although far from conclusive, it would seem reasonable 
181 John H. Blume, supra note 28, at 305.
182 Id. at 305 n.121.
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to infer that Lexington County’s issues with representativeness are 
not unrelated to its high death sentencing rates.
B. Findings on Gender: Voir Dire and Peremptory Strikes
A comparison of Table 2 (Summary of All Removals According 
to Gender) with Table 3 (Removals for Views on Death by Gender) 
and Table 4 (Proportion of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes 
by Gender) illuminates the influence of gender in the jury selection 
processes studied. A superficial assessment of men’s and women’s 
removals, shown in Table 2, suggests that men and women were 
treated equally during the selection process because their outcomes 
are virtually the same (p = 0.8274, χ2). For instance, men and 
women were excused for cause at the same rate (both 53%), struck 
at around the same rate (16% and 14%, respectively), and seated on 
the jury at the same rate (12% each).
Yet, Tables 3 and 4 show that Table 2’s summary does not 
tell the whole story. Rather, Table 3 (p < .001, 2-tail Fisher exact) 
shows that men and women were treated differently by the court, 
while Table 4 (p = 0.0002909, 2-tail Fisher exact), shows that men 
and women were treated differently by the parties. Specifically, 
Table 3 shows that more men than women were removed for their 
excessive support for the death penalty, whereas more women than 
men were removed for their inability to impose death. The data in 
Table 4 indicate that the defense exercised peremptory strikes on 
significantly more men than women (59% of defense strikes), and 
that the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes on significantly 
more women than men (59% of prosecution strikes).
Interestingly, echoing similar findings by others such as Mary 
Rose (in the context of race), the opposing parties’ disproportionate 
use of peremptory strikes according to gender “cancelled each other 
out.”183 Namely, the defense used 41% of its strikes on women and 
59% of its strikes on men whereas the prosecution used 59% of its 
strikes on women and 41% of its strikes on men, a difference which 
is statistically significant (p < 0.0002909, 2-tail Fisher exact) — 
suggesting that gender may have been a factor in strike choices. It is 
possible that controlling for gender-neutral bases for strikes would 
eliminate this disparity. However, this finding is consistent with 
183 Cf. Rose, supra note 98, at 698, 700; Diamond et al., supra note 171, at 425.
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prior conclusions, such as in Baldus’s Philadelphia study,184 that 
gender was a factor in parties’ choices of whom to strike.
The same “cancelling out” effect occurred with excuses for 
cause: because women tended to oppose death and men favored 
it more, they were removed during voir dire in roughly equivalent 
numbers. But do the equal numbers in removals in the end justify 
the means? It may appear that the extreme ends of the spectrum on 
death views are innocuously correlated with gender: men, on one 
end, are shaved off for favoring death too strongly, whereas women, 
on the other end, are shaved off for opposing death, resulting in a 
jury pool in the middle with equal representation of the genders. It 
is possible that such a “middle of the road” jury was the result here; 
since women and men ended up seated on juries in equal numbers, 
the juries at least appear representative. However, the death-
qualification process is known to skew the jury pool toward a pro-
prosecution bias.185 Although the genders were equally represented, 
it is unclear whether conviction-proneness and pro-death biases also 
evened out. 
In any case, the disparate impact on women as 58% of anti-
death removals reflects the concerns raised above about death 
qualification’s disproportionate effects on some groups over others. 
In light of this impact’s potential to affect jury impartiality and 
representativeness, and the jury’s supposed protective functions, 
this effect on women should be of concern, notwithstanding the 
even gender outcomes.
C. Findings on Race: Voir Dire and Peremptory Strikes
The findings on race are consistent with previous studies’ 
conclusions. Race as a factor in venire members’ removals in the 
23-case subset observed revealed strong statistically significant 
differences at both the voir dire stage and in parties’ use of peremptory 
strikes. Although removal for opposition to the death penalty is 
nominally a race-neutral reason for removal, the data here at least 
demonstrate the overwhelming disparate impact such removals had 
on black prospective jurors.
Unlike with gender, discrimination by opposing sides did 
not cancel itself out for race. Rather, the data here show that it was 
184 David C. Baldus et al., supra note 24, at 96-97.
185 Lynch & Haney, supra note 26, at 73.
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more difficult for black jurors to be seated on the jury than for white 
jurors. A rate of 20% of black prospective jurors ended up on juries 
or as alternates while 29% of whites did — with black jurors seated 
at roughly 2/3 the rate of white jurors.
The data in Tables 5 (Summary of Removals throughout the 
Selection Process, by Race), 6 (Removals for Views on Death, by 
Race), and 7 (Percentage of State and Defense Peremptory Strikes by 
Race) illustrate the different experiences of a white venire member 
and an African American venire member in the set of cases studied. 
Black potential jurors were excused for cause at a higher rate than 
whites (56% and 33%, respectively) (p < .001, χ2). The results in 
Table 6 indicate that a majority of those black individuals removed 
for cause were excused because of their opposition to the death 
penalty. Of the 234 total black venire members, 130 blacks were 
removed for cause, including 75 individuals removed for anti-death 
penalty views — representing 58% of blacks removed for cause and 
32% of the overall black venire group. By contrast, 72 of 284 whites 
removed for cause (constituting 25% of whites removed for cause 
and eight percent of the overall white venire group) were excused 
because of their opposition to the death penalty. While only two 
blacks were excused for favoring the death penalty, approximately 
22% of whites excused for cause (63 of 284) were removed for pro-
death views.
Although these findings might not remain as strong with 
comprehensive data, they illustrate the problematic nature of 
removals for cause on the basis of opposition to the death penalty. 
Not only did such removals have a disparate impact on women and 
African Americans, but it virtually precluded a significant portion of 
black prospective jurors from serving on the jury at all. This tension 
illustrates the basic catch-22 of “fair cross section” jurisprudence 
and jury representativeness in capital cases: it is impossible to 
reconcile representativeness with the need for impartiality in capital 
punishment cases, since particular groups are more likely to have 
strong feelings in opposition.186
Although the overall percentage of blacks removed via 
peremptory strike was lower than the overall percentage of whites 
removed via peremptory strike (16% and 31%, respectively), the 
proportions listed in the second row of Table 5 are misleading. First, 
they do not take into account the smaller number of blacks available 
186 Price, supra note 7, at 103-04.
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to strike, since such a high proportion was removed at the for-cause 
stage. After removing the first row in Table 5 (reducing the pool to 
those who were available to be struck), the data show that 37% of 
black prospective jurors were struck (thirty-nine out of 104 black 
individuals remaining after for-cause removals), whereas 47% of 
whites remaining were struck (268 out of 570 white individuals 
remaining after for-cause removals). This difference in strikes 
calculated using these proportions is not statistically significant (p 
= 0.3053, 2-tail fisher exact) and thus shows that whites and blacks 
were struck at comparable rates, rather than the twice-higher rate 
reflected for whites in Table 5.
But more critically, as illustrated in Table 8, the prosecution 
struck 35% of blacks who made it through the voir dire process, 
compared to 12% of whites.187 The prosecution used 36 of its 104 
strikes on black individuals (36% of its strikes), even though blacks 
constituted only 15% of individuals available to be struck.188
The crux of these numbers is that the prosecution struck 
187 The racial disparities in the parties’ use of their peremptory challenges were 
significant (p < .001, 2-tail Fisher exact). 
188 South Carolina procedure appears to dictate that the prosecution goes first in 
the parties’ alternating use of their strikes. See Juror Information, S.C. Judicial 
Dep’t, http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/jurorinfo/jurorSelection.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2017) (“In criminal cases . . . [t]he clerk calls out the name 
of the juror. This juror comes forward and stands in front of the jury box. The 
clerk says, ‘What sayeth the State?’ The Solicitor, representing the State, will 
say either (1) ‘Excuse the juror,’ in which event the juror takes his or her seat 
back in the courtroom; or (2) ‘Present the juror,’ or ‘Swear the juror.’ The 
clerk will then ask, ‘What sayeth the defendant?’ The defendant’s attorney 
may say (1) ‘Excuse the juror,’ in which event the juror takes his or her seat 
back in the courtroom; or (2) ‘Swear the juror,’ in which event the juror takes 
a seat in the jury box as directed by the clerk.”). If the prosecution used a 
strike on a potential juror, the pool available for the defense to strike becomes 
smaller. It might be a concern that if the defense used its strikes first in each 
trial, the pool that was available for the prosecution to strike would have had 
different racial proportions than the one that includes the overall numbers. 
The trends observed above weaken somewhat but persist even if it is assumed 
that all 200 white venire persons that the defense struck were not available 
to the prosecution. If that were the case, the prosecution struck 68 out of 370 
whites available to be struck or 18% of them — still substantially lower than 
the 36% of blacks struck by the prosecution, which persists after adjusting for 
the only three black venire persons struck by defense. The adjusted numbers 
would also mean that African Americans were 21% of the pool available to be 
struck by the prosecution, but the prosecution used 35% of their strikes on 
them. These adjusted numbers remain statistically significant at the .05 level 
(p = 0.007949) using a 2-tail Fisher exact test.
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blacks at a rate higher than they were represented and removed 
one-third of eligible black jurors. A comparable disparity emerged in 
O’Brien and Grosso’s study, where the prosecution struck 52.6% of 
eligible black venire members and 25.7% of all other eligible venire 
members.189 Of course, the defense had even more dramatically 
differing numbers for each race, using only one percent of its strikes 
on blacks. But again, where the concerns are jury representativeness, 
the jury’s protective function for the defendant, and non-arbitrary 
imposition of death sentences, it is easier to forgive the defense’s 
discrimination and its countervailing ethical obligations than it is 
the prosecution’s discrimination.
The present study unfortunately did not control for race-
neutral explanations for the use of strikes, unlike in O’Brien and 
Grosso’s study. Potentially, these disparities would not persist or 
would weaken with such controls. But, such an outcome seems 
unlikely. O’Brien and Gross’s study revealed little difference in 
outcomes when they controlled for race-neutral factors.190 Other 
studies have shown similar trends.191 It is reasonable to infer here 
that the defense was targeting whites and that the prosecution was 
targeting blacks.192
Finally, the combined effects of anti-death removals and 
prosecutorial strikes had dramatically disparate impacts according 
to race. Seventy-five African Americans were removed for anti-
death views and 36 were struck by the prosecution. Combined, 
this excluded group constitutes 47% of the 234-person black venire 
pool. Compare this with 72 whites removed for anti-death views 
and 68 whites struck by the prosecution — constituting 16% of the 
854-person white venire pool. While this is not formally a scheme 
to systematically exclude a particular racial group from jury service, 
it would seem to be a de facto one.
189 Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1548.
190 O’Brien & Grosso, supra note 7, at 13.
191 Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 16, at 1536-40 (discussing other studies).
192 It appeared from the majority of the trial transcripts that litigants did not raise 
a significant number of Batson challenges. One challenge by the prosecution 
was observed, where the prosecution alleged discrimination against a white 
juror. Since only portions of some transcripts were available, however, it is 
possible that Batson challenges were made and not observed.
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VI. Conclusion
The data here illustrate capital punishment’s persistent 
problems with jury representativeness and show trends unlikely to be 
unique to South Carolina, given their consistency with the literature 
on race- and gender-related exclusion during jury selection. First, 
although limited in their generalizability and statistical perfection, 
disparities related to race and gender in the jury selection process 
were pervasive in this study. Most significantly, race apparently 
motivated the parties’ use of peremptory strikes, and gender likely 
did as well. These data contribute to the knowledge of the ineffectual 
impact that Batson and progeny have had in state courts. They also 
raise questions about the fairness and constitutionality of the trials 
of certain South Carolina inmates currently on death row.
Further, removal of prospective jurors for their opposition 
to the death penalty stands in tension with a defendant’s Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
The death-qualification process functioned as a substantial 
impediment to jury service by African Americans in this study. 
A process with such a dramatic disparate impact on black jurors 
flies in the face of Taylor’s holding that “no one racial group may 
be systematically excluded from jury service” — particularly when 
viewed in tandem with the effects of prosecutorial strikes. This 
tension, combined with death qualification’s disparate impact 
on women, suggests that states maintaining capital punishment 
schemes have embraced a fiction: that it is possible to reconcile 
death qualification with society’s interest in, and defendants’ rights 
to, impartial, representative juries.

